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Since1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have experienced major institutional
transformations. As part of that process, territorial contestations between states and ethnic
minorities engendered three outcomes: negotiated territorial self-government (TSG) arrange-
ments; the denial of such arrangements; and the emergence of de-facto states. Through a qual-
itative comparative analysis of twenty-four minorityTSG claims in seventeen post-communist CEE
states, we find that: (i) TSG arrangements emerged as externally facilitated instruments for man-
aging or preventing violent conflict in predominantly low-capacity, only partially democratic states;
(ii) peacefully pursued TSG claims were most likely to be denied in high-capacity consolidated
democracies; and (iii) de-facto states emerged where patron-states intervened in violent conflicts
in low-capacity states. These findings defy widely held expectations about the influence of
Europeanization, coupled with democratic consolidation, on the accommodation of minority
claims; and they offer new insights into the significance of external intervention for the institu-
tional outcomes of ethnic minorityTSG claims.
Territorial self-government (TSG) claims by ethnic minority groups present
significant challenges to states around the world. Conflicts over such claims are
likely to be violent (Fearon and Laitin 1999; Weidmann et al. 2010) and protracted
(Walter 2003). The failure to accommodate ethnic minority populations through
broadly acceptable and sustainable institutional arrangements is thus a potentially
costly miscalculation for governments to make. Although a rich body of empirical
scholarship has emerged about minority territorial claims, systematic comparative
research into the conditions under which such institutional arrangements result
from ethnic minority TSG claims remains scarce. Much of the literature focuses on
the initial and final phases of territorial contestation. This literature is primarily
concerned with two issues: why and how minority groups make territorial claims in
the first place; and whether, once established, specific territorial arrangements—such
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as ethno-federation or federacy—induce further conflict or help to resolve it. The
literature on the causes of territorial contestation covers a range of explanations,
including feasibility (Buhaug et al. 2009; Collier et al. 2009; Weidmann 2009),
economic opportunity (Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Fearon 2005), structural factors
(Benedikter 2007; Lapidoth 1996), and economic, cultural, security, or political
grievances (Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985; Siroky and Cuffe 2015; Theuerkauf 2010).
Situated between the initiation of a territorial claim and its ultimate effect on
stability and conflict, there are two important questions that have received
surprisingly little attention: (i) What makes governments accommodate or deny
minority self-government claims? (ii) Under what conditions do conflicts over such
claims result in broadly acceptable institutional outcomes? Among the few
comparative studies addressing the first question, Svensson and Lindgren (2011)
focus on the outcomes of separatist claims. Shaykhutdinov (2010) includes a more
comprehensive range of territorial claims, asking whether violent or nonviolent
strategies are more likely to succeed. Sorens (2009) focuses on partisan political
calculations as sources of government concessions in post-1970 Western European
democracies. In an analysis focused on parliamentary representation, Alonso and
Ruiz-Rufino (2007) show that this mitigation mechanism has no effect on
secessionist conflicts. On the second question, Coakley (1990) provides a
comparative account of six newly-independent European states after World War I.
There is a pressing need to advance the general understanding about when and
how legitimate and sustainable institutional outcomes are likely to emerge from
state-minority contestations over territorial claims—not only in situations involving
violence or secessionism, but also in peaceful and non-secessionist settings. Our
aim is to contribute to this understanding by developing an argument about the
conditions under which states accommodate or deny minorities’ claims for TSG, in
the context of significant institutional opportunities for governments and
minorities to renegotiate such claims. Thus, instead of asking why claims for
minority TSG arrangements emerge (Cunningham 2013; Jenne et al. 2007), what
strategies minority groups use (Shaykhutdinov 2010), or how TSG impacts stability,
conflict and violence (Brancati 2006; Iff 2013; Sambanis and Milanovic 2014), we
ask: under what conditions are TSG claims accommodated or denied when
opportunities arise for the renegotiation of state-minority relations?
Faced with intra-state territorial claims, ruling elites can either grant some form
of TSG or deny the accommodation of such claims. Previous research indicates
that, from a global perspective, peacefully pursued claims (both secessionist and
non-secessionist territorial claims) have a higher chance of achieving new
institutional outcomes (Shaykhutdinov 2010). Comparative case studies also
indicate that, when a minority claimant group cannot negotiate an acceptable
institutional arrangement, and the minority remains part of the existing political
system, the legitimacy of that system becomes weaker in the eyes of the minority
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population (Sze´kely 2014). In other cases of nonaccommodation, minorities exit
from the political system and unilaterally declare independence, resulting in either a
‘‘de-facto state’’ (Caspersen and Stansfield 2010) or a more broadly recognized new
state (Wolff 2013a). As these differences in institutional outcomes have major
consequences for long-term peace and democratic development (Chapman and
Roeder 2007), it is important to understand the different pathways through which
they emerge. Consequently, our analysis of state-minority territorial contestations
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) between 1989 and 2012 seeks to provide
critical insights into the conditions under which states are likely to grant or deny
minority TSG claims.
We present our argument in four parts. First, we describe our general approach
and case selection. Second, we explain our categories for institutional outcomes of
state-minority territorial contestation and define the concept of TSG. Third, we
map the variation in institutional outcomes in post-communist Europe from 1989
to 2012. Fourth, we evaluate the impact of domestic and external conditions
commonly considered important in explaining the evolution of territorial
contestation, and the way they combine to produce multiple pathways toward
institutional outcomes. Our principal findings derived from the CEE institutional
experience are as follows. Consolidated EU Member States do not grant TSG to
minorities as part of the democratic claim-making process. Instead, TSG emerges as
an externally facilitated arrangement in violence-affected weak states on the
European periphery. In such states, status change and patron-state intervention also
leads to the emergence of de-facto states. We conclude with lessons drawn from
experiences in post-communist Europe, which highlight the significance of direct
international involvement in the management of state-minority territorial
contestations.1
Approach and Case Selection
To contribute empirically and analytically to the question of why particular and
distinct outcomes emerge from territorial contestations, we focus on a typological
subset of such cases. The temporal and spatial setting of post-communist Europe is
particularly well-suited for exploring the conditions under which institutionalized
TSG arrangements are more likely to emerge from state-minority contestations
during periods of major institutional transformation.
Our understanding of ‘‘minority’’ is similar to the definition most broadly cited
in international law, formulated by Francesco Capotorti: ‘‘a group numerically
inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose
members - being nationals of the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only
implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed toward preserving their culture, traditions,
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religion or language’’ (Capotorti 1979: pararaph 568). By ‘‘state’’ we mean the
state’s central government, controlled in large measure by a demographically and
electorally dominant group.
The dramatic institutional transformations of the post-1989 era created
unprecedented opportunities for the institutional renegotiation of state–society
relations generally in this region, and a significant number of minority groups
made TSG claims that resulted in state-minority contestations (Csergo00 2007; Jenne
et al. 2007; Koinova 2010; Vermeersch 2003). The period between 1989 and 2012 in
CEE brought the collapse and reconstruction of states, as well as the transnational
project of ‘‘Europeanization’’—encompassing EU enlargement and its alternative,
the European Neighbourhood Policy, both of which encouraged minority
accommodation. These processes fundamentally reconfigured the domestic and
international incentives and resources available for minorities to present collective
claims, and for states to respond to them.
Evidence from around the world indicates that minority TSG claims are often
accommodated during major institutional transformations. By way of illustration, in
Italy, five regions with special autonomy statutes were created after World War II (Bull
1999), while in Spain autonomous communities were established after the end of the
Franco dictatorship (Bo¨rzel 2000; Sala 2013). Outside Europe, post-Suharto Indonesia
(Aspinall and Fealy 2003), post-Saddam Iraq (McGarry and O’Leary 2007), post-conflict
Nepal (Lecours 2013), and post-Somoza Nicaragua (Brunegger 2007) can similarly serve
as examples of the accommodation of minority TSG claims in times of transition.
Additionally, there are examples of democratically negotiated TSG arrangements in
Denmark (Greenland), the UK (devolution in Scotland and Wales), and Belgium (the
federalization process since the 1980s).2
Consequently, we could reasonably expect the governments of democratizing
CEE countries with a European policy outlook at a time of transformation to
engage in a negotiated accommodation of TSG claims. Yet we find no evidence for
this. Quite the contrary: a survey of TSG arrangements in CEE indicates that the
more democratic and closer to the EU governments are (geographically and in
terms of policy orientation), the less likely they are to accommodate TSG claims.
Examining this puzzle is thus interesting and relevant both analytically and
empirically.
Our cases were selected according to the presence of the following scope
conditions: (i) significant opportunity to reform state institutions during the post-
1989 transformation of former socialist regimes; (ii) participation in the
Europeanization process (EU accession, European Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern
Partnership); and (iii) mobilization by at least one ethnic minority group in the
state in pursuit of TSG during the period we cover. Thus, we do not include
minority groups that make claims only to cultural and linguistic autonomy, or
guaranteed representation in national parliaments. For example, in Poland, we
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include Opole Germans but not Silesians or Kashubians. With these criteria in
mind, we generated a set of twenty-four claimant groups in seventeen countries in
CEE, including Kosovo and excluding Russia.3 There are several grounds for the
exclusion of the Russian federation. First, while Russia was affected by the overall
Europeanization process, it at no point sought to engage with any of the two types
of Europeanization processes we identified, thus not satisfying our second scope
condition. Second, from a methodological standpoint, with thirty-three TSG-
claiming groups of which twenty-five have received some form of it, the Russian
federation would severely skew our analysis toward one country in which minority
TSG as a meaningful practice of accommodating ethnic diversity has been in doubt
since the early 2000s (Ku¨pper 2013). Territorial contestation in the cases included
resulted in some form of TSG for eight minorities in seven countries; no TSG is
available for the remainder of eleven groups in eleven countries; and five groups in
four countries have established de-facto states.
To assess the influence of key domestic and international factors shaping the
institutional outcomes of territorial contestation, we employed qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) (Schneider and Wagemann 2006). This methodology
is appropriate for our sample of twenty-four cases for evaluating the impact of
indicators that capture broad trends rather than discrete events (Rihoux and Ragin
2009). QCA is also particularly appropriate for the analysis of phenomena that
involve ‘‘equifinality,’’ i.e., multiple distinct pathways leading to similar outcomes
(Schneider and Wagemann 2006: 753). We constructed a dataset for minorities that
have made TSG claims in CEE (including the South Caucasus) since the first part
of the twentieth century, focusing on the post-1989 period, drawing on the
Minorities at Risk Project (2009), Minority Rights Group International (2009), and
the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009). When coding our
variables, we relied additionally on qualitative data from State Reports, Opinions,
Comments and Recommendations submitted under the Council of Europe’s
Framework Convention on National Minorities (Council of Europe 2009), the
Freedom House Index (Freedom House 2011, 2014), especially the ‘‘Nations in
Transit’’ index (Freedom House 2013), the Polity Project (Marshall et al. 2015), the
Fund for Peace Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace 2014).4 We also relied on our
own fieldwork-obtained qualitative information derived from previous and ongoing
research projects on a large subset of the cases addressed here.5
Conceptualizing Outcomes of Territorial Contestation: TSG, Its
Absence, and De-Facto Statehood
There are considerable conceptual and empirical disagreements in the literature
about what constitutes institutionalized intra-state TSG, further complicated by a
predominant focus on just two forms of TSG: autonomy (or federacy) and
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federation.6 The difficulty in conceptualizing TSG has long been recognized in
political science and international law (Potier 2001: 54). The one common feature
most definitions of TSG share is that the self-governing entity exercises certain
powers independently from other levels of government. Such arrangements can
incorporate executive, legislative, and judicial powers to varying degrees, but they
fall short of full sovereignty. Following Wolff and Weller (2005), TSG is the legally
entrenched power of territorially delimited entities within the internationally
recognized boundaries of existing states to exercise public policy functions
independently of other sources of authority in this state, but subject to its overall
legal order. Accommodating TSG claims entails more than statewide regionalization
or decentralization, which might provide de-facto control over institutions for
minorities that compose local or regional majorities. Rather, it means the deliberate
use of state construction for the management of territorial contestation by
recognizing ethnically defined ‘‘homelands’’ as legitimate legal personalities for the
exercise of TSG.
Based on empirical observation, we identify three distinct TSG arrangements in
contemporary CEE: federation, federacy, and local self-government (table 1).7
 Federation: extensive self-rule with institutionalized shared rule. This implies a
constitutionally entrenched structure in which the entire territory of a state is
divided into separate political units, all of which enjoy certain exclusive
executive, legislative and judicial powers independent of the federal government,8
such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 Federacy arrangement: constitutionally entrenched extensive self-rule for specific
entities. The main distinction between a federacy arrangement and a federation is
that the former enjoys similar powers and constitutional protection as federal
Table 1. Types of TSG arrangements in CEE, 1989–2012
Federation Country Federacy Country Local self-government
Group Group Group
Croats (Federation
of Bosnia and
Herzegovina/
entity level)
Georgia Adjars in Adjara Kosovo Serbs in Central
and Southern Kosovo
Moldova Gagauz in Gagauzia Macedonia Albanians
Serbs (Bosnia and
Herzegovina/state
level)
Serbia Hungarians in
Vojvodina
Ukraine Ethnic Russians
in Crimea
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entities, but is distinct in that it does not necessitate territorial subdivisions
across the entire state territory. In other words, federacy arrangements are a
feature of otherwise unitary states, such as in the cases of Vojvodina (Serbia) or
Gagauzia (Moldova).
 Local self-government: executive and administrative powers at the local level.
Guided by the application of the principle of subsidiarity, local self-government
involves the exercise of executive and administrative powers by lower levels of
government, including regional and municipal authorities. It does not include
legislative competences but provides the power to pass by-laws. Recent examples
of the application of this form of TSG as a mechanism of conflict resolution in
divided societies include Macedonia9 (under the 2001 Ohrid Agreement) and
Kosovo (under the terms of its 2008 constitution and related ‘‘Ahtisaari
legislation,’’ as well as the April 2013 agreement over the creation of a Union of
Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo).10
Outcomes of Territorial Contestation in Post-Communist Europe
In our study, the presence of TSG means that one of these institutional forms is
available for substate ethnic communities to exercise a degree of self-government in
‘‘their’’ homeland, while state majorities retain overall control of the same territory
that they consider part of ‘‘their’’ state. We code ‘‘TSG availability’’ where any form
of TSG identified above is present. The underlying assumption is that all forms of
TSG commit the state and minorities to recognize the validity of each other’s
claims and to respect the parameters of an institutional setup designed to
accommodate them. The state accepts limitations on its authority to exercise public
policy functions within part of its territory. Minorities accept the overall legal
constitutional order of the state and its existing borders, and they use TSG neither
as a stepping-stone toward unilateral secession nor as a way to limit within the self-
governing territory the constitutional rights of all of the state’s citizens.
We define the absence of TSG as an outcome of contestation in which a claimant
group seeks TSG, the state refuses to grant it, and the claimant group remains part
of the political system. This category refers only to situations where a state has
denied TSG claims by a significant minority political party or equivalent
organization. The absence of TSG does not mean that the claimant group abandons
its demand: claims may persist or subside.
A different outcome of territorial contestation is the establishment of de-facto
states. These are entities in which a separate government has been established which
is de facto sovereign but lacks international recognition, i.e., de jure sovereignty
(Caspersen 2011; Kolstø 2006; Lynch 2007). De-facto states can emerge along
distinct pathways with different starting points, e.g., the state denies a TSG claim or
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an existing TSG arrangement is abrogated, and in response the claimant group exits
the political system due to its failure to gain or retain a desired degree of TSG.
Explaining the Outcomes of TSG Claims in Post-Communist CEE,
1989^2012
We derive two main logics of explanation from the existing comparative literature on
minority territorial claims: one that links the outcome of state-minority territorial
contestation to a broad set of state-level and minority-centric domestic factors; and
another that links them to external intervention by international organizations or a
patron-state. The first set of factors relate to the power differential between minorities
and majorities in the state; while the second set relates to external pressures and counter-
pressures in the context of actual or threatened violence. We first discuss the significance,
and analyze the impact, of individual determinants of TSG outcomes. We then use QCA
to examine which conditions combine in what way to create distinct pathways toward
TSG, the denial of TSG, and de-facto statehood.
Domestic Conditions
In the analysis that follows, we explore the significance of four domestic factors for
the outcomes of TSG claims: (i) state capacity and regime type; (ii) minority status
loss in the context of post-1989 transformation; (iii) minority demographic and
socioeconomic resources; and (iv) violence in the territorial contestation process.
Table 2 lists all TSG-claiming minorities and summarizes key features at the
domestic level.
Regime type and state capacity
Regime type and state capacity (state strength) are commonly used as independent
variables in both quantitative and qualitative studies of inter-group conflict. Our
question is whether these general state characteristics help to explain the
institutional outcomes of territorial contestation in the post-communist context.
Thus, we need to determine whether and how regime type and state capacity shape
governments’ preparedness to accommodate minority TSG claims. Among scholars
that address similar questions, Walter hypothesizes that ‘‘democratic regimes are
more likely to negotiate with challengers than non-democracies,’’ because
‘‘democratic governments are thought to face greater domestic constraints on the
use of force, be more sensitive to the rights of individuals seeking self-
determination, and have a greater range of possible compromise solutions to offer
ethnic groups’’ (Walter 2003: 144f). Walter’s findings confirm that democratic
regimes are more likely to accommodate minority TSG claims. In the context of
our focus on post-1989 CEE, we should expect similar findings in line with the
8 Z. Csergo00 et al.
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literature on Europeanization: as countries in this region become more democratic
and ‘‘European,’’ they should adopt more accommodating responses to territorial
contestation similar to established patterns across the western part of the continent
(Keating et al. 2009; Kymlicka 2007; Wolff 2013b).
Regarding state capacity, Walter (2003) uses defense expenditure and the
number of military personnel as indicators for state strength, hypothesizing that
‘‘[c]ountries with relatively small defense expenditures and relatively small armies
were expected to be more likely to accommodate challengers than countries with
large defense expenditures and large armies’’ (Walter 2003: 144f.) Most studies of
state-minority territorial contestation also rely on GDP per capita scores as a proxy
for state strength (Cunningham 2013; Fearon 2004), as well as on a variety of state
strength indices that aggregate socioeconomic and military variables.
In this study, we use Freedom House’s three-point ordinal regime type to
categorize cases by regime; and scores from the Failed States Index (Fund for Peace
2014), Brookings’s Index of State Weakness (Rice and Stewart 2008), and GNI per
capita to measure state strength.11
Our results highlight three broad patterns. First, consolidated CEE democracies
with high state capacity are unlikely to grant TSG to minorities. In fact, no state
that satisfied the requirements for high state capacity and democratic government
has accommodated minority TSG demands. This pattern explains eight of eleven
cases in which TSG has been denied, and it reinforces our finding that EU
membership coupled with democratic consolidation did not make TSG claims
more negotiable (see below). Only the remaining three denials of TSG occurred in
low-capacity, partial democracies.
Second, the fact that TSG granting occurs in low-capacity, partial democracies
(in seven of eight cases in which TSG claims were accommodated) suggest that
TSG became a coping mechanism in CEE, indicative of a state’s weak bargaining
power in relation to minority claimants. Serbia is the only relatively consolidated
democracy that granted a form of TSG (Vojvodina) following Milosˇevic´’s removal
from power in 2000. However, Serbia remains a relatively low-capacity state, the
regional self-government is not exclusively associated with the Hungarian minority,
and implementation of the TSG regime remains incomplete.12
Third, all five cases of de-facto statehood (Armenians in Azerbaijan, Abkhaz and
South Ossetians in Georgia, Northern Serbs in Kosovo and Transnistrians in
Moldova) emerged in low-capacity states, including three partial democracies and
an authoritarian regime.
Status loss in the context of state transformation
Status loss has been identified as significant in inter-group conflict, but not
specifically in relation to TSG availability (Koinova 2013; Petersen 2011). The
Institutional Outcomes of Territorial Contestation 11
collapse of communist regimes after 1989, in a large number of cases, resulted in
status loss for ethnic groups (i.e., for eleven of twenty-four minority claimants).
This process created new or post-imperial minorities (e.g., ethnic Russians and
Russian-speakers in Estonia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and led to status reversals for
previously dominant groups, such as Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and
Kosovo.
While research shows status loss to be a major factor in mobilization for violent
conflict (Cederman et al. 2010; Gurr 1993; Siroky and Cuffe 2015), there is little
systematic research on how it affects the outcomes of territorial contestation. On
the one hand, we could expect greater accommodation of claims when status loss
occurs in a democratizing context, where governments are ‘‘more sensitive to the
rights of individuals seeking self-determination’’ (Walter 2003). Alternatively,
existing scholarship has also demonstrated that support from powerful external
actors makes the violent pursuit of TSG claims more likely—shifting the balance of
power such that governments are more likely to concede demands (Nome 2013;
Walter 2003). We could thus expect minorities backed by powerful kin-states or
similar patrons to be in a stronger bargaining position vis-a`-vis their governments
and thus able to pursue their TSG demands more successfully. On the other hand,
we could also assume that newly-independent states and states that have broken
free from Soviet domination would pursue nationalizing policies vis-a`-vis minority
groups (Brubaker 1996), and thus be less likely to grant TSG.
While we do find some confirmation of these expectations, our analysis does not
reveal easily generalizable patterns across CEE. States are disinclined to grant TSG
in the absence of minority status loss, but status loss is neither sufficient nor
necessary for TSG. Situations where minority TSG was associated with status loss
(i.e., Russians in Crimea; Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) also
involved significant violence or a strong threat thereof, as well as significant
external intervention forcing state elites to accommodate TSG demands to preserve
the territorial integrity of a new state. The clearest pattern we found was that all
five cases of de-facto statehood are associated with collective status loss, or evident
threat thereof, after 1989.
Collective resources for mobilization
Scholarship on ethnic mobilization, and particularly mobilization for violence,
indicates that differences in the collective resources available to ethnic communities
play an important role in shaping the motivation for, and feasibility of, violent
conflict, and that they do so differently for conflicts over territory and government.
Buhaug et al. (2009) find that absolute and relative distance from the capital,
proximity to international borders, and availability of lootable resources increase
the likelihood of longer-lasting conflicts. The likely explanation is that favorable
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locations directly and indirectly increase rebel fighting capacity (and motivation).
Similarly, Fearon (2004) points out that so-called sons-of-the-soil conflicts typically
last longer than conflicts over government (coups or revolutions) because ‘‘a stable
regional autonomy deal is harder to construct when the political centre’s stakes in
the region are greater . . . [and] when the rebel force can extract more from a
region during the course of a war’’ (Fearon 2004: 297). Toft also makes the point
that ethnic groups’ settlement patterns determine the legitimacy and capability of a
group’s mobilization: ‘‘where both capability and legitimacy are high – as they are
for a group that is concentrated in a region, especially if that region is its homeland –
an ethnic group is likely to consider control over disputed territory an indivisible
issue and demand independence’’ (Toft 2001: 3). Thus, accommodation of TSG
demands is only likely ‘‘[i]f an ethnic group is willing to accept an outcome short
of full independence, or if the state sees its territory as divisible’’ and does not ‘‘fear
precedent-setting’’ vis-a`-vis other groups with potentially similar demands (Toft
2003). Walter makes a similar argument, noting that ‘‘the economic, strategic, or
psychological value of land does not fully explain government decisions to settle or
fight when territory is at stake;’’ rather, ‘‘governments consistently refuse to
negotiate not because land is especially valuable as many people have argued,
but because they fear that a concession to one state or one separatist group
will encourage other parties to seek their own share of a limited pie’’ (Walter
2003: 138).
To test whether these general findings also hold for our sample of post-1989
cases of territorial contestation in CEE, we draw on several indicators to account
for collective resources that can be mobilized in territorial contestation. We first
look at demographic factors such as relative group size, territorial concentration,
and the proportion of the minority living in its historical homeland. We also assess
socioeconomic and political indicators of minority collective resources, such as
relative economic status and economic discrimination using data from the
Minorities at Risk Project (2009). The former measures barriers to minority
economic activity and social mobility while the latter measures the type of
organization available to the minority to mobilize. Our evaluation reveals no clear
pattern regarding the impact of group size or territorial concentration on the
success of TSG claims. Concerning socioeconomic status, it appears that economic
discrimination is higher in the case of minorities without TSG than it is in the case
of those that have achieved TSG or established de-facto statehood. Finally, using
data about the level of Group Organization for Joint Political Action (Minorities at
Risk 2009), we find no clear pattern between minorities’ level of organization and
the granting of TSG claims. The overwhelming number of minorities in CEE
organized political parties and civil society organizations, and TSG granting did not
correspond to more robust forms of organization. On the other hand, all cases of
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de-facto states involve minorities organized in both parties and violent militant
organizations.
Inter-ethnic violence in the context of state-/regime transformation
Violence appears as a key factor in the literature on inter-group conflict, but its
impact on the institutional outcomes of minority TSG claims is complex. On the
one hand, significant violence in a contested region may force minority claims onto
the agenda (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) or trigger third-party pressure or
intervention (Kuperman 2005). On the other hand, violence may prompt states to
reject plans for granting TSG (Horowitz 2003), rescind existing TSG arrangements
(Siroky and Cuffe 2015), or respond with disproportionate violence to suppress
minority claims (Walter 2006).
In CEE, territorial contestations between current majorities and minorities
involved significant instances of violence since 1989 in just over half of our cases
(thirteen of twenty-four). Among eight cases of existing TSG, six involved violence.
In the same timeframe, Ukraine and Serbia established federacy arrangements in
the absence of violence (to accommodate demands by ethnic Russians and Russian-
speakers in Crimea and ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, respectively). However,
the threat of violence was important in Crimea; and violence was significant in
other regions of Serbia, as well as to a certain level in Vojvodina proper (Jenne
2004). Thus, violence was part of the context of accommodation in both cases.
Where TSG was denied, violence was also usually absent (ten of eleven cases); and
only one violent conflict has not yielded TSG (Serbs in Croatia13). Finally, all five
cases of de-facto statehood involved violence.
Our analysis therefore suggests that post-1989 patterns of violent conflict have
significantly shaped the granting of TSG arrangements in CEE, but violence was
neither necessary nor sufficient for TSG granting. The occurrence of violence is
strongly intertwined with external intervention, indicating the importance of
analyzing the combination of these factors more closely.
The Power of External Intervention
To explore the role of external factors that the extant literature identifies as
significant for either reducing and preventing conflict or exacerbating existing
conflict by encouraging or discouraging particular institutional designs,14 we first
evaluate the influence of ‘‘Europeanization’’ in broad terms. Then, we analyze
patterns of more direct intervention (military and diplomatic) by two types of
external actors: (i) international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN),
the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE); and (ii) patron-states involved in the contestation.
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The influence of ‘‘Europeanization’’ on the emergence of TSG arrangements
The literature on the effects of Europeanization identifies several processes by
which new members and candidate countries might be swayed into accommodating
minority TSG claims—from the diffusion of European norms to ‘‘harder’’ forms of
leverage through accession conditionality.15 The EU is expected to ‘‘de-securitize’’
state-minority and minority-patron state relations, cases of which abound in CEE.16
Although minority-patron state relationships can generate significant security
concerns, the European framework is expected to decrease the relevance of conflict
over state borders—given that relevant actors form part of a larger political entity
that encourages increased regional mobility and a more accommodating approach
to minority issues based on an acceptance of common norms and values (Cordell
and Wolff 2005; Csergo00 and Goldgeier 2004; Kelley 2004; Sasse et al. 2004). As an
aspect of expectations about the influence of ‘‘Europeanization,’’ Western European
models of institutionalized minority TSG can serve as ‘‘good practice’’ examples in
CEE (Kymlicka 2007). The majority of Western European states have accommo-
dated minority TSG claims in various forms, including federations in Belgium and
Switzerland, devolution in the United Kingdom, and regional autonomy in
Denmark and Finland (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001: 29–31).17 Building on pre-1945
legacies, many of these arrangements emerged in the context of ‘‘Europeanization’’
which in its broadest sense implies the establishment of a democratic security
community in post-Cold War Europe (Keating 2008). According to this logic, we
should expect that issues of TSG become matters of peaceful democratic
contestation within actual and aspiring EU member states, and that the existing
pattern of accommodation of minority TSG claims in Western Europe would
facilitate similar responses to territorial contestation in CEE (Galbreath and
McEvoy 2012; Jutila 2009).
Our findings indicate, however, that CEE states remain reluctant to grant
minorities TSG—in line with arguments that fear of secession, reputational effects
on other minorities’ claims, and the economic, strategic or symbolic values of
contested territories for majorities override whatever effect the EU has on minority
policies in new and aspiring Member States (Bochsler and Szo¨csik 2013; Toft 2001;
Walter 2003). Thus, Europeanization has had little impact on state majorities’
inclination to allow TSG arrangements to emerge ‘‘democratically’’ in processes of
post-communist institutional restructuring.
TSG arrangements were not granted in any state that is considered a
consolidated democracy and is an EU member (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). TSG arrangements emerged only
among less-consolidated democracies outside the EU. Of the six current applicant
countries, four provide TSG to at least one claimant group (Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia) and two do not (Albania,
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Montenegro). Kosovo, moreover, during part of the period under consideration
(2008–2012) included a de-facto state in the Mitrovica region. Of the remaining
states covered by the EU’s Eastern Partnership, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine
provided TSG arrangements on a selective basis from 1989 to 2012. Thus, the closer
states are tied to the EU and the more consolidated their democratic regime is, the
less likely they are to accommodate TSG claims. This runs counter to widely-held
expectations that (i) the EU’s influence will make TSG issues matters of peaceful
democratic contestation; and (ii) Europeanization engenders similar institutional
outcomes across the continent. The question arises of what other forms of
international intervention might account for cross-regional differences in the
institutional outcomes of TSG claims.
International military and non-military intervention in conflict settings
Extant literature establishes significant links between intra-state inter-group conflict
and third-party intervention. Intervention can affect conflict onset, dynamics and
resolution, and empirical research suggests that third-party action can either pacify
or exacerbate existing conflict (Carment, James, and Taydas 2006; Jenne et al. 2007;
Weller and Wolff 2005). Post-communist CEE provides evidence for both patterns
(table 2). To understand these dynamics, we explored the impact of two types of
direct external intervention. We distinguish between (i) international interven-
tion—by which we mean the intervention of international and regional
organizations, as well as major international powers that are not parties to the
territorial contestation; and (ii) patron-state intervention—which in CEE usually
means intervention by a kin-state in support of ethnic kin in a neighboring state.
Empirical research indicates that the Hungarian government’s patron-state activism
has had both moderating and exacerbating effects on local Hungarian minority
claims in Serbia, Slovakia and Romania. Hungarian minority claims were pursued
peacefully in all cases (Csergo00 and Goldgeier 2004; Jenne et al. 2007; Waterbury
2010). Russia has played an ambiguous and changing role as a patron-state. In the
1990s, the Russian government and the OSCE (through its High Commissioner on
National Minorities) facilitated a negotiated agreement between Crimean separatists
and the Ukrainian government. In 2004, when Adjaria (Georgia) was on the brink
of major violence after the re-imposition of Georgian authority on that region,
Russia’s intervention helped to prevent violent escalation. In relation to de-facto
states created within post-Soviet states—i.e., Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia),
Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), and Transnistria (Moldova)—in contrast, Russia
supported the separatists, but it also mediated cease-fire negotiations and
participated in international mediation efforts. Serbian patron-state activism has
been most often unambiguously conflict-generating from 1989 to 2012 (Caspersen
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2008). Germany, in contrast, has consistently been a moderating force (Cordell and
Wolff 2005).
We found a close link between the emergence of TSG and international
intervention (both military and non-military) in violent contexts, while the lack of
intervention was consistently associated with the denial of TSG in nonviolent
conflicts. International intervention in territorial contestations typically occurred in
response to violence. Nonmilitary involvement facilitated TSG more than military
intervention. International non-military intervention occurred in seven of eight
cases resulting in TSG (Croats and Serbs in BiH, Adjars in Georgia, Central and
Southern Kosovo Serbs, Albanians in Macedonia, Gagauz in Moldova and Crimean
Russians). International military intervention occurred in four cases where TSG was
granted (Croats and Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina, as well as Albanians in
Macedonia and Serbs in Central and Southern Kosovo). However, in three of those
cases (Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Albanians in Macedonia)
international non-military intervention was also present.
Patron-state intervention had a mixed effect. Military intervention by patron-
states occurred in a minority of cases that yielded TSG (Croats and Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albanians in Macedonia), while non-military intervention
by a patron-state occurred in half of the cases where TSG exists (Adjars in Georgia,
Central and Southern Kosovo Serbs, Hungarians in Vojvodina, and Russians in
Crimea); but also in five of eleven cases where TSG was denied (Turks in Bulgaria,
Russians in Estonia, Opole Germans in Poland, and Hungarians in Romania and
Slovakia). The impact of patron-state military intervention is stronger and
unambiguous on de-facto statehood—as evidenced by all five cases in the region
(Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh; Abkhaz and South Ossetians in Georgia, Serbs
in Northern Kosovo, and Transnistria in Moldova).
Overall, our findings regarding the impact of external intervention on the
institutional outcomes of TSG claims are three-fold. First, external intervention
occurred in all cases where minority TSG demands were granted. In the majority of such
cases, non-military international intervention occurred in the context of violent
conflicts. Hungarians in Serbia and Russians in Crimea represent exceptions, where
external involvement facilitated TSG in the absence of violence. In Crimea, the
involvement of external actors (e.g., OSCE and the Russian patron-state) happened in
the context of a significant threat of violence, which it prevented from materializing. For
Hungarians in Serbia, EU member Hungary lobbied actively in international fora; and
the Serbian government had strong incentives to reinstate Vojvodina’s regional
autonomy as part of an effort to demonstrate democratic credentials in pursuit of EU
membership after more than a decade of wars.
Second, where minority TSG claims were denied, yet claimant groups remained
in the political system, international intervention was absent or weak, and patron-
state activism was also either absent or occurred as non-military support. TSG was
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denied after violent conflict in only one case, Serbs in Croatia, which lacked
significant external support.
Third, where patron-states intervened militarily, in most cases the outcome was
de-facto statehood, unless there was an international military counter-intervention
to prevent that outcome, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo.
Patron-state military intervention thus appears as a necessary, albeit not sufficient,
condition of de-facto statehood.
Possible Pathways toward TSG, Its Denial and De-Facto
StatehoodçQCA Analysis
Our analysis of individual conditions of TSG outcomes revealed sharp differences
between consolidated democracies in CEE that are part of the EU (which all deny
TSG to their minorities) and other, low-capacity states in the region, where TSG is
available dependent on third-party responses to violent conflict. Individual
conditions, however, combine in different ways to make TSG available, unavailable,
or to produce situations of de-facto statehood. Our analysis suggests that two main
pathways have led to the granting of TSG, while two others have led to the denial
of TSG. A single pathway has led to de-facto statehood. To identify and summarize
combinations of factors that affect the outcome of TSG claims, we performed a
crisp set QCA of our dataset of twenty-four cases, as developed by Ragin (2000),
using fs/QCA3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2014). QCA is a highly relevant technique for
the analysis of institutional change or continuity, as it captures broad factors that
operate over time. It is also well suited to the analysis of conditions that impact
territorial outcomes only in combination with other conditions, such as intra-state
violence and third-party intervention.
Instead of estimating the net causal effect of discrete variables, QCA specifies the
combinational logic of necessary and sufficient conditions needed to obtain a given
outcome. The analysis aggregates individual cases into a manageable number of
typical ‘‘scenarios.’’ These scenarios, in turn, encapsulate the causal mechanisms
that link certain sets of conditions to alternative institutional outcomes (e.g., TSG
availability, its denial, and in some cases the establishment of a de-facto state).18
Table 3 highlights the minimal conditions for our three outcomes and reveals
the typical combination and sequencing of conditions leading to TSG, its denial,
and de-facto statehood.
Two sets of conditions lead to the denial of minority TSG claims. In the most
common pattern, high-capacity democratic EU Member States deny TSG claims. In
the absence of inter-group violence, no international intervention occurs to
generate a negotiated TSG outcome. Patron-state lobbying on behalf of the
minority is the typical form of external involvement, such as in the case of Poles in
Lithuania or Hungarians in Romania. In the second pattern, low-capacity non-EU
18 Z. Csergo00 et al.
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states also deny TSG in the absence of inter-group violence, which receive neither
international nor patron-state support, as in the case of Crimean Tatars or Sandzˇak
Muslims.
Two sets of conditions lead to the granting of TSG. A first pathway involves
international (military or non-military) intervention in response to actual inter-
group violence in a weak non-EU state. TSG subsequently emerges as an
internationally facilitated, negotiated outcome. This pattern was typical of conflicts
in the former Yugoslavia. A second, less common, pattern involves the granting of
TSG by low-capacity non-EU states, in the absence of violence and with non-
military intervention by a patron-state. This pattern covers the cases of Crimea in
the mid-1990s and of Hungarians in Vojvodina.
Finally, a single set of conditions leads to de-facto statehood, suggesting that
these conditions are collectively sufficient to bring about this outcome. The set
includes military patron-state intervention in low-capacity states where the
minority experienced status loss or threat thereof in the transitional period (1989–
1992), and inter-group violence ensued in that context. While military patron-state
intervention between 1989 and 2012 occurred only in violent cases, it is important
to note that violence alone is a necessary but not sufficient condition for de-facto
statehood.
Conclusion
Our study provides important insights into the institutional outcomes of minority
TSG claims, based on a comparative analysis of cases in post-communist CEE from
1989 to 2012. These cases enable us to identify conditions under which TSG is
granted or denied in the context of territorial contestations during institutional
transformations that allow for comprehensive renegotiation of state–society
relations; and what outcomes can be expected when TSG claims are denied. Our
findings have important empirical and theoretical implications.
Empirically, our most significant finding is that the overwhelming majority of
TSG arrangements emerging in post-Cold War CEE resulted from externally
facilitated conflict management (i) in the context of major state crises involving
violence or a significant threat thereof, (ii) in low-capacity states, (iii) most of
which were non-democracies or partial democracies. This finding adds to a
growing literature on the benefits of TSG as a conflict-mitigating mechanism
(Bakke 2015; Cederman et al. 2015). It also provides a corrective to a body of
scholarship that is critical of TSG arrangements to the extent of alleging it has a
conflict-inducing rather than conflict-mitigating effect (Chapman and Roeder 2007;
Cornell 2002).
Theoretically, our findings suggest the need for reevaluating the utility of
Realpolitik, balance-of-power considerations in explaining the outcomes of intra-
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state territorial contestations. The fact that high-capacity, consolidated democracies
are able to deny minority TSG claims and maintain their sovereignty and territorial
integrity; while low-capacity, non-consolidated democracies are generally unable to
do so (because they also face external pressure or even military intervention) points
in this general direction. Put differently, external intervention appears to tip the
balance in favor of negotiated TSG outcomes or de-facto statehood, while its
absence seems to allow high- and low-capacity states alike to deny TSG claims
without triggering violent responses from minority TSG claimants.
Such a plausible ‘‘hunch’’ generates new avenues for future research into the
actors and mechanisms of an overarching Realpolitik framework that encapsulates
the distinct pathways we have identified toward the three outcomes of intra-state
territorial contestation in CEE. First, our findings highlight the need for more
research about the conditions under which conflict mitigation by way of
accommodating TSG claims is a feasible strategy for international actors to pursue
in transitional and post-war contexts. Further research on directive mediation
strategies (Bercovitch and Houston 2000) can explore which strategies might
produce broadly acceptable and sustainable outcomes. For example, the EU-
mediated agreement between Serbia and Kosovo in April 2013 indicates that non-
military international involvement may result in negotiated minority TSG even in a
case where a de-facto state has already been established. Kosovo represents perhaps
the clearest indication of the possibility that Europeanization may lead to
negotiated agreements, albeit in relation to relatively low-capacity (host and kin)
states susceptible to the same (i.e., EU) external leverage.
Second, our finding that stronger, more consolidated democratic states in CEE
that joined the European Union did not accommodate minority TSG claims
requires further investigation. While minority interest in TSG has not disappeared,
none of these countries has experienced violent contestation. More research is
necessary to explore whether (and if so what) it is specifically about
Europeanization and democracy that has prevented the violent escalation of
conflicts despite the denial of TSG claims. We cannot rule out that EU membership
itself is a form of ‘‘external intervention’’ that tips the balance in favor of states
when it comes to denying minority TSG claims; while only offering relatively
minimal assurances to minorities, through guarantees of basic civil and political
rights and liberties within a democratic institutional framework.
More research is necessary also into the way external intervention shapes
domestic ‘‘balances of power.’’ The Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014,
and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, raise the possibility that initially
unambiguously non-secessionist claims or TSG arrangements can change to
demands for secession or irredentism in the context of decisive external
intervention. This scenario might become relevant for Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Republika Srpska, Croat cantons in the Federation), as well as for Macedonia and
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Montenegro in relation to their Albanian communities; and it raises the possibility
of a Kosovo and/or Albania-driven irredentism. Here, as elsewhere in CEE and
possibly in Western Europe (e.g., Catalonia, Scotland), much will depend on the
viability of European integration and the degree to which the European Union can
sustain its current role as a viable regional/international actor capable of projecting
power and influence within and beyond the borders of its Member States.
The experiences in post-Cold War Europe provide important lessons for
multiethnic societies in other regions where opportunities arise for renegotiating
state–society relations. Clearly, peacefully negotiated institutional outcomes in
states that include politically resourceful territorialized minorities that seek TSG
arrangements also require external actors that are ready to facilitate peaceful
outcomes. Domestic political (state and minority) elites, in turn, share a great
responsibility in negotiating broadly acceptable, legitimate and sustainable
institutional arrangements that enable democratic consolidation and state stability.
If they are unable or unwilling to do so, our findings tentatively suggest a potential
return to the Realpolitik calculations of ethnopolitics that have bedeviled Europe in
the past at tremendous human cost.
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Notes
1. See Jenne (2015).
2. On territorial self-government in Western Europe, see, among others, Keating (1998);
Lecours (2012); and Sorens (2009).
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3. Our categorization of outcomes reflects conditions at the end of 2012. We thus count
Crimean Russians as a case of federacy, Crimean Tatars as a case of no TSG, and we
include Kosovo as a state. The status of Crimea changed significantly after its Russian
annexation in March 2014, and institutional outcomes in Eastern Ukraine are still
developing at the time of writing. Kosovo was under international administration
between 1999 and 2008, then declared independence from Serbia. Although Serbia
contests Kosovo’s independence, its recognition by over 100 UN Member States, in our
view, justifies treating Kosovo as a state. The constitution of Kosovo makes specific
provisions for local governance units with significant non-Albanian populations. During
the period on which we focus (1989–2012), ethnic Serb organizations in the Mitrovica
region of northern Kosovo demanded self-government and established a de-facto state.
However, Serb minorities in other regions (Central and Southern Kosovo) remained
under the Kosovo constitution.
4. Our complete dataset is available in online Appendix 1.
5. This fieldwork consisted of semistructured interviews with state officials and minority
political elites, as well as participant observation, in the following subregions: Central
and Eastern European states that joined the EU before 2012 (Estonia, Lithuania, Poland,
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia); states in the Western Balkans that were EU candidate
and potential candidate states before 2012 (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina); post-
Soviet states with an EU Association Agreement (Moldova, Georgia) and without one
(Azerbaijan).
6. For an overview of this debate, see Wolff (2001). On the distinction between the
ideologies of autonomism and federalism, see Lluch (2012).
7. Each of these arrangements can be applied with their territorial boundaries cutting
either across or around the settlement areas of ethnic or national minorities. Our
analysis focuses on arrangements with the latter kind of territorial boundaries.
8. There are common exceptions to this entire-territory rule. Capital cities, for example,
unless they are federal entities of themselves, often have special status (Washington,
D.C., vs. the German capital Berlin, which has Bundesland status).
9. We refer to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM) by its constitutional
name.
10. According to our definition, de-facto power gained by an ethnic minority in local
councils through the regular electoral process in an otherwise significantly centralized
state does not qualify as TSG. Examples are: Russophone domination in city councils in
Riga and Tallinn; Hungarian domination of local councils in the Szekler region
(Bochsler and Szo¨csik 2013).
11. Freedom House’s three-point scale of regime type is widely used in comparative
research. We distinguish between low- and high-state capacity based on per capita GDP
and scores from the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace 2014). Seminal
studies on ethnonational contestation using per capita GDP as a proxy for state capacity
include Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2005).
12. Personal communication from Petar Teofilovic, 14 April 2016.
13. Serbs in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) briefly attained de-facto statehood during the
Yugoslav wars; then had a brief self-governing status under the United Nations
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Transitional Mission for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)
between 1996 and 1998, before being fully integrated into Croatia without any TSG
arrangements. By 1995, however, the Serbian TSG-claiming population had been
drastically reduced.
14. Conceptual works include Brubaker (1996); Smith (2002). Empirical studies include
Carment et al. (2006); Saideman et al. (2002); and Weller and Wolff (2005).
15. On the diffusion of norms and practices of accommodation, see Galbreath and McEvoy
(2012). On the impact of The Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, see Verstichel et al. (2008). On ‘‘hard’’ EU conditionality, see Sasse (2008).
16. We use ‘‘patron-state’’ as a general term that covers similar relationships not necessarily
grounded in ethnic ties between a minority and a supporting state actor, such as in the
case of Russia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In CEE, patron-states are
predominantly kin-states (i.e., states supporting an ethno-nationally defined external
kin minority in another state).
17. Substate territorial claims in Western Europe have been denied in only three cases: for
Germans in Denmark, Basques in France, and Muslims in Greece (Wolff 2013a).
18. The complete QCA procedure is available in online Appendices 3 and 4.
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